Somehow, the command of the US. Army decided Iraqis were dangerous...

4 Years Ago I arrived in Iraq... There was no Al Qaeda.. No foreign fighters.. The Military.. never allowed any unaccompanied Iraqis on their bases. (Yet) They have allowed thousands of third country nationals to come into the bases.. employed by KBR and other lesser contracting companies. [law - thousands of foreigners but no Iraqis ? And people wonder why they hate US!]

* Marshall Adame's diary :: ::

Four Years Ago I arrived in Iraq. I left Three Years Later, Different

Today, March 19, 2007, marks the 4th anniversary of the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.

Two months from now four years ago I was driving across the Southern border of Iraq on my way to assume the position as the CPA Airport Director of Basrah International Airport. It was an electric time. From my perspective, America and several other countries had just liberated a people form a tyrannical dictator who had spent the past three decades repressing and killing them.

In Basrah, Iraq the people welcomed the presence of the Coalition soldiers and came into the streets waving and cheering the newly arrived liberation army. That willingness to embrace their liberators did not last long.

Within a few months of our arrival the population of Iraq began to be disillusioned by our occupation and openly began to resist our efforts to direct their future. Within a year, that disillusionment would become an insurgency.

There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq at that time. No foreign fighters or training agents from Iran were active in Iraq then. Those who began the resistance in Iraq were Iraqi citizens who did not want to lose their country again to an occupying force, nomatter who they were , or why they came. A force who had already started exercising some pretty heavy handed practices throughout Iraq against those who they had come to rescue.
Somehow, the command elements of the U.S. and British Armies had decided the population at large represented a danger to Coalition forces.

When we entered the second year of our presence in Iraq I was in Baghdad. Iraqi citizens had, by then with few exceptions, been purged from any coalition Iraq rebuilding groups or planning committees that had, earlier, operated out of any American / Coalition base or green zone area.

The Green zone, where the seat of the New Provisional Iraq Government was and where the U.S. Embassy had set up in Saddams palace was the real exception. The U.S. State Department, over military objections, allowed hundreds of Iraqis to work in the embassy compound in administrative and civil action positions.

The Military compounds throughout Iraq have never allowed any unaccompanied Iraqis on their bases. They have allowed thousands of third country nationals to come into the bases to serve the facility requirements, employed by KBR and other lesser contracting companies.

By early 2005 the entire Iraqi population, with few exceptions, were excluded from any American civil or rebuilding efforts. Iraqi engineers were not utilized in the rebuilding planning effort even though they had the most historical and technical knowledge of the Iraqi cities and infrastructure throughout Iraq. Iraqi medical doctors and professors were hardly utilized in any way in the formulation of rebuilding efforts intended to establish Rule Of Law and Medical Facilities throughout the country.

Americans were doing the planning. All guess work. Very, very expensive guess work. There was one group of Iraqis that the Military planners could not throw enough money at. The Iraq Police Forces under the control of the infamous Iraqi Interior Ministry Bayan Jabr.

Minister jabr is generally credited with creating the Shia death squads with the Iraqi Police. I was an advisor to this Minister. He was as anti-American as any could be. He hated Sunnis and had a friendly relationship with Muqtada Al Sader. While I was there he played the American Military commanders from the MNST-I and CPATT elements like a fiddle. Today he is the Iraqi Minister of Finance.

They, under the direction of then Maj. Gen. D. Petraeus, turned over weapons and vehicles to the minister like there was no tomorrow. Although I am on record as protesting the blind behavior of the US Generals working with the Ministry of Interior, I was not able to effect change.

The MNST-I command element under Army Maj. General Fil was able to downgrade the Department of State Advisors from their oversight positions to administrative positions. I was able to get moved to a more senior position within the Provincial Reconstruction Teams at the Embassy.

The irony of it all would be comical if the situation was not so serious and deadly. Paul Bremer laid the ground work for the failed leadership in Iraq. everybody else followed. It all seemed so insane to me by 2006.
On July 2nd, 2006 my son was wouned in a battle in Baqubah, just South of Baghdad...

More at the source!

Daily Kos: Four Years Ago I arrived in Iraq. I left Three Years Later, Different


Post a Comment

<< Home