8/19/2005

Joint Interagency Cooperation - The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection

From the horse's mouth... Theere WAS cooperation between DoD and FBi -- law

Task forces and working groups designed to facilitate interagency coordination have existed for years, but they were usually ad hoc, limited in authority, narrow in scope, and viewed with suspicion by most governmental entities, including the Department of Defense (DOD). As a result, such organizations have had difficulty breaking down barriers and penetrating information stovepipes. For example, on September 11, the United States had at least five different lists of its most wanted terrorists.2 President George W. Bush had previously issued National Security Presidential Directive 1, replacing 102 interagency working groups with a three-tiered National Security Council (NSC) system for interagency coordination. But joint doctrine-the authoritative guidance that should have provided assistance in navigating interagency waters-lagged badly.3 According to Joint Vision 2020, "The primary challenge of interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of participating organizations."4

2 The State Department's TIPOFF program, the Federal Aviation Administration's "No-Fly" list, and the CIA's, FBI's, and U.S. Customs Service's individual watch lists.

3 Consider the following: Although civilian agencies usually have a lead role in military operations other than war, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07 (1995), has only one substantive reference to interagency coordination: that it "will often involve other...agencies." While Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Joint Publication 3-07.1, addresses using military forces in support of civilian agencies, its focus is only on U.S. operations "in support of host-nation efforts," and Special Operations Command is the lead agency for drafting the FID revision, that is, interagency coordination is for special operations. Joint Staff (J7), Program Directive for JP 3-07.1 for Foreign Internal Defense, GEN-ADMIN 282232Z Jun 02. The "Interagency Coordination," chapter of Joint Forces Capabilities, Joint Publication 3-33 (1999), merely observes that "nonmilitary organizations provide valuable knowledge, expertise, and unique capabilities." Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Joint Publication 5-00.1 (2002) notes that "during...interagency planning, heavy...commander involvement...and coordination will be a key to success," but does not explain how to effect such coordination. Even Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (October 1996) envisions its recommended interagency coordination cells as temporary and post-hoc, requiring close coordination "with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff."

NOTES

1 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).

2 The State Department's TIPOFF program, the Federal Aviation Administration's "No-Fly" list, and the CIA's, FBI's, and U.S. Customs Service's individual watch lists.

3 Consider the following: Although civilian agencies usually have a lead role in military operations other than war, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07 (1995), has only one substantive reference to interagency coordination: that it "will often involve other...agencies." While Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Joint Publication 3-07.1, addresses using military forces in support of civilian agencies, its focus is only on U.S. operations "in support of host-nation efforts," and Special Operations Command is the lead agency for drafting the FID revision, that is, interagency coordination is for special operations. Joint Staff (J7), Program Directive for JP 3-07.1 for Foreign Internal Defense, GEN-ADMIN 282232Z Jun 02. The "Interagency Coordination," chapter of Joint Forces Capabilities, Joint Publication 3-33 (1999), merely observes that "nonmilitary organizations provide valuable knowledge, expertise, and unique capabilities." Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Joint Publication 5-00.1 (2002) notes that "during...interagency planning, heavy...commander involvement...and coordination will be a key to success," but does not explain how to effect such coordination. Even Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (October 1996) envisions its recommended interagency coordination cells as temporary and post-hoc, requiring close coordination "with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff."

4 Joint Vision 2020 (2000), 26.

5 Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley, "DoD Proposal to Augment CINC Staffs," memorandum for NSC Deputies Committee, January 29, 2001, 2.

6 The Posse Comitatus Act, an 1878 law prohibiting using the Army to "execute the laws," except where authorized by the U.S. Constitution or Congress, 18 U.S. Code 1385, applies to the Air Force by amendment (1956) and Navy by DOD regulation, 32 C.F.R. Section 213.2 (1992). Federal military personnel operating pursuant to Presidential power to quell domestic violence and National Guard forces operating under Title 32 state authority are exempt from the act. Moreover, under 1981 amendments, 10 U.S. Code 371-78, supportive and technical assistance, for example, the use of facilities, vessels, aircraft, intelligence, technological aids, and surveillance, are permitted, while only direct participation of DOD personnel in such activities as searches, seizures, and arrests are prohibited. The act itself contains no prohibition against military receiving law-enforcement-generated information.

7 Intelligence oversight is regulated by E.O.12333, with implementing policy in DOD 5240 1-R. Military intelligence components may collect information on U.S. persons when that component has the mission to do so, the information falls within a specified category (notably foreign intelligence and counterintelligence), and the U.S. persons are reasonably believed to be engaged in terrorist activities. If that collection occurs within the United States, there must also be a connection with a foreign power or organization.


The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection

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